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Abstract
This paper is a quantitative, equilibrium study of the insurance role of severance pay
when workers face displacement risk and markets are incomplete. A key feature of our
model is that, in line with an established empirical literature, job displacement entails
a persistent fall in earnings upon re-employment due to the loss of tenure. The model
is solved numerically and calibrated to the US economy. In contrast to previous studies
that have analyzed severance payments in the absence of persistent earning losses, we find
that the welfare gains from the insurance against job displacement afforded by severance
pay are sizable.
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1. Introduction
Employment contracts often contain explicit severance-pay provisions.1 Many coun-
tries also mandate minimum levels of severance pay and other forms of employment
protection. Both privately-contracted and legislated severance pay provisions are com-
monly increasing, approximately linear, functions of job tenure (see, e.g., OECD 2013 and
Parsons 2013). The existence of these measures is difficult to understand in the context
of standard, complete-markets models in which workers maximize expected labor income
and wages are perfectly flexible. As observed by Lazear (1990), employment protection
measures have no useful role in such a setting. This has lead some authors (e.g., Pis-
sarides, 2001) to conclude that the debate about employment protection has been mostly
conducted within a framework that is not appropriate for a proper evaluation of its role.
There is robust evidence documenting both the failure of complete risk sharing2 and
the substantial costs associated with job loss.3 For example, Couch and Placzek (2010)
estimate earnings reductions for workers affected by mass layoffs of more than 30 percent
in the post-displacement year and as much as 15 percent six years later. The extent and
persistence of displacement losses has prompted calls (e.g., LaLonde, 2007) for the intro-
duction of long-term insurance for displaced workers by means of earnings supplements
upon re-employment. Yet, loss-based, earnings-replacement insurance is subject to moral
hazard issues due to its conditionality on wages being lower in the new job. In fact, the
lack of, even public, provision of earnings-replacement insurance suggests that this kind
of issues are even more relevant than in the case of unemployment insurance.
1Parsons (2013) reports that 36 percent of US workers in firms with more than 100 employees and
16 percent in smaller businesses, were covered by severance-payment clauses over the period 1980-2001.
For the UK, the 1990 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey reveals that 51 percent of union companies
bargained over the size of (non-statutory) severance pay for non-manual workers and 42 percent for
manual workers (see Millward, Neil et al., 1992). For Spain—a country usually thought to have high
levels of state-mandated employment protection—Lorences et al. (1995) document that from 1978–91,
the proportion of collective bargaining agreements establishing severance pay in excess of the legislated
minimum varied between 8 and 18 percent in the metal manufacturing sector and between 22 and 100
percent in the construction sector.
2See, e.g., Attanasio and Davis (1996) and Hayashi et al. (1996).
3Examples include Topel (1990), Jacobson et al. (1993), Farber (2005), Couch and Placzek (2010)
and Davis and von Wachter (2011). Couch and Placzek (2010) also provide a survey of existing estimates
of the earning losses from job displacement.
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These considerations suggest that a candidate explanation for the existence of sever-
ance pay is as a means of (imperfectly) insuring displaced workers against labor market
risk and, in particular, against the persistence of earnings losses upon re-employment.
The objective of this paper is to provide a quantitative, equilibrium framework to
assess the role of severance pay as an insurance device. The crucial features of our
analysis that distinguish it from existing contributions are: a detailed modeling of the
sources of labor market risk, and imperfect insurance. In particular, in addition to labor
market search frictions, we allow workers’ productivity and job duration to be functions
of both age and on-the-job tenure. Namely, job displacement risk has two components:
the—temporary—loss of earnings associated with transition through unemployment and
the—persistent—loss of earnings upon re-employment due to the loss of tenure. To isolate
the pure insurance role of severance pay, we assume, following Lazear (1990) and most
of the matching literature, that wages are flexible (full bonding). Given the significance
that life-cycle factors—namely, asset accumulation and the positive correlation between
age and job-tenure—play for this trade-off, we cast our analysis in a life-cycle setting.
A calibrated version of our model implies the following results. First, the average
welfare gains of realistic severance pay schemes are positive and quantitatively important,
ranging between 0.5 and 1 percentage points. Second, a large fraction of these gains
stem from the fact that severance pay provide insurance against the—persistent—loss of
tenure associated with job displacement. In fact, in the absence of tenure effects on wages
severance pay would actually reduce average welfare,4 as the insurance gains would be
more than offset by the fall in precautionary saving and the equilibrium capital stock.
Finally, the model can explain why severance pay is generally an increasing function of
on-the-job tenure. Keeping constant the average severance transfer, the average welfare
gains are between 15 and 20 per cent higher if the transfer is (linearly) increasing in
tenure. A tenure-independent transfer over-insures workers with low tenure.
The paper is related to a large literature that can be divided into two main strands.
The first strand studies the role of employment protection measures in environments
with risk-neutral agents. Its main result ( Lazear, 1990) is that, if wage bargaining is
4This result is in line with the findings in Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) who use a similar welfare
metric. Our average welfare gain/loss is the average of the individual losses associated with moving from
one steady state to the other, where the average is taken with respect to the cross-sectional distribution
in the benchmark economy.
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efficient, employment protection is non-neutral only if it entails a tax component that
is lost to the firm-worker pair. This “firing tax” is always welfare-reducing and has
ambiguous, and model-specific, employment effects.5 Conversely, severance pay—the
pure transfer component of employment protection measures6—is neutral unless efficient
wage bargaining is constrained. If downward-rigid wages in ongoing matches results in
inefficient separation, severance pay reduces job destruction and increase job creation and
efficiency as long as entry-wage flexibility allows workers to pre-pay for future transfers (
Saint-Paul, 1995; Fella, 2000, 2012). Entry-wage rigidity constrains such pre-payment and
implies that severance pay reduces job creation and, possibly, employment and efficiency
(Garibaldi and Violante, 2005).
This paper is closer to the second, and more recent, strand of the literature that de-
velops microfoundations for the (potential) relevance of legislated employment protection
measures based on risk-averse workers and incomplete markets. Fella and Tyson (2013)
build an incomplete-market version of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and use it to
characterize the privately-optimal size of severance pay and show that Lazear’s (1990)
neutrality result (approximately) holds despite asset market incompleteness. Alvarez and
Veracierto (2001) were the first to study the welfare effects of severance payments in an
incomplete market setting. Our findings are complementary to theirs. Differently from
us, they assume that a unique wage applies to all jobs and, therefore, that job destruction
is inefficiently high in the absence of severance pay. As pointed out by Ljungqvist (2002),
it is this assumption of wage rigidity, rather than market incompleteness, that accounts
for the large welfare gains they find. Instead, Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) find that
the pure insurance benefit of severance pay is negligible and even negative in their en-
vironment, given the short duration of a typical unemployment spell and the absence of
tenure effect on wages, which implies that the earnings of displaced workers fully recover
upon re-employment.
5Firing taxes depress employment in environments with employment lotteries (Hopenhayn and Roger-
son, 1993), and in matching models if they increase workers’ threat point in new matches. The latter
is the case only if firms, counter-factually, incur the firing tax even if an encounter with an unemployed
worker is not turned into an employment relationship, as in Millard and Mortensen (1997) (see Ljungqvist
2002 and reference therein for a comprehensive discussion).
6Garibaldi and Violante (2005) and Fella (2007) argue that firing taxes are unlikely to be quantitatively
important.
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Rogerson and Schindler (2002) is the first quantitative equilibrium study of the welfare
costs of the risk of persistent earnings losses. They evaluate the welfare costs of a one-
off, mid-career, permanent earnings loss in an incomplete-market setting, but with no
unemployment. They find that the welfare cost of a permanent 30% earnings loss at
age 45 is around half a percentage point of permanent consumption. Since the shock is
one-off, permanent and common to all workers it can be perfectly insured by a common,
one-off transfer equal to about four years of wages. Unlike them, the combination of
returns to tenure and positive job loss hazard in each period implies heterogeneity of
displacement costs in our environment. We find that the welfare gains from severance
pay are significantly larger in our set up, despite the fact that our parameterization
implies more conservative and non-permanent displacement costs, and that we restrict
attention to a (linear) severance-pay schedule in line with observed measures.
Krebs (2007) evaluates the welfare gains from eliminating the cyclical variation in
idiosyncratic job displacement risk, while we study the welfare gains from using severance
pay to provide insurance against the average job displacement risk.
Michelacci and Ruffo (2014) study the optimal age profile of unemployment benefit
replacement rates in a life cycle model with unemployment risk and on-the-job accumula-
tion of (general) human capital. They show that the trade-off between moral hazard and
insurance/liquidity provision associated with unemployment benefits is weak for young
unemployed workers, who have little wealth and high returns to on-the-job human cap-
ital accumulation, and steep for older workers. As a result, optimal replacement rates
are strongly decreasing in age. They find that allowing for optimal severance pay adds
little to the welfare gains from the optimal policy, but conjecture that this result may be
due to the absence of returns to tenure (as opposed to labor market experience) in their
model. Our findings indeed confirm that severance pay is a valuable, complementary
form of insurance/liquidity provision when earnings losses reflect the loss of accumulated
job tenure.
On the positive side, the paper is also related to a number of recent contributions that
propose alternative mechanisms to generate realistic displacement costs. In line with the
job-ladder models of Jarosch (2015) and Krolikowski (2015), it generates earnings losses
as a result of both lower average match quality upon reemployment and a downward-
sloping separation-tenure profile that slows down the rate of which workers rebuild match
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capital.7 In Huckfeldt (2016) there is effectively a job ladder across occupations, with
better occupations having both higher productivity and higher rates of skill accumula-
tions. Persistent earnings losses are the result of job loss being associated with a fall off
the occupational ladder. Our environment captures these forces in reduced form, while
maintaining sufficient tractability to study the welfare implications of earnings losses.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model,
Section 3 discusses the calibration and Section 4 presents the main results. Finally,
Section 5 discusses the sensitivity of the results to our assumptions, while Section 6
concludes.
2. The model
2.1. Environment
Demographics, preferences and endowments: The economy is populated by a
continuum of agents (workers) of measure one in every period. Agents have stochastic
lifetimes, transiting through working ages i ∈ I = {1, 2, ..., I} , retirement8 and, even-
tually, dying. We denote by pii the, constant, age-transition probability and by ρi the
retirement probability for an agent of age i. Retired agents die with constant probability
pid and are replaced by an offspring who starts life as an unemployed.
Agents do not value their offsprings’ welfare and have time-separable preferences with
time discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). Their intra-period utility function is defined over con-
sumption c and search effort ψ as
U(c, ψ) = u(c)− vψ,
with v > 0 and u (.) strictly increasing, strictly concave, and satisfying the Inada con-
ditions. The search effort choice is binary (participation) and defined over the set Ψ ≡
{0, 1}.9
Let b ∈ B ≡ {0, 1} denote an unemployed worker’s benefit entitlement status. Agents
of working age can be employed, unemployed and eligible to collect unemployment
7The coexistence of these two forces was first documented by Stevens (1997).
8We consider a retirement period because of its role in generating a realistic saving behavior.
9Note that for the same consumption level, employed workers enjoy (weakly) higher utility that
unemployed workers and quitting a productive job is never optimal. This feature, together with the
binary effort choice, simplifies the analysis substantially. A previous version of this paper, allowing for
continuous job search effort, yielded very similar results, but also numerical instability.
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benefits—b = 1—or unemployed and ineligible to collect unemployment benefits—b = 0.
Employed workers supply labor inelastically. Newly born agents are endowed with a0
units of the consumption good.
We index job tenure in the last job held by t,10 with t ∈ T = {1, ..., T}. Tenure on the
current job increases with constant probability pit > 0 between successive tenure levels
until t = T.
We assume that both tenure and age affect the productivity of a worker and denote
by εs the productivity level of a worker of type s ≡ (i, t) and by S the set of worker
types I ×T . The component of productivity related to age i can be thought of as general
human capital. Conversely, the component of productivity due to on-the-job tenure t is
not transferable and lost upon job loss. Age and tenure transitions are assumed to be
independent events.
Technology: Each production unit (firm) uses one worker and capital to produce output
according to a common, constant returns to scale technology. The output of a firm
employing a worker of productivity εs and Ks units of capital is Ys = F (Ks, εs). The
same production function in intensive units is ys = f (ks), with ks = Ks/εs. Capital
depreciates at the exogenous rate δ.
Labor Market: Unemployed workers meet a firm with an unfilled vacancy with proba-
bility φ(ψ) with φ(1) > φ(0) = 0. Keeping an open vacancy is costless and there is free
entry of vacancies.
At the beginning of each period a currently-active firm and its worker of type s bargain
over the wage ws according to the generalized Nash bargaining solution. After the wage
is agreed upon, capital is rented and production takes place. We consider the limit case
in which the workers’ bargaining weight converges to one.11
At the end of the period, the firm can be hit with exogenous probability σs > 0 by
10Namely, t denotes tenure in the current job match for employed workers (including new hires) and
tenure in the last job for unemployed workers.
11The assumption implies that wages are determined only by productivity and severance payments. If
firms had positive bargaining power wages would depend on the workers’ marginal utility of consumption
and wealth. This would substantially complicate the problem as one could not solve recursively for
equilibrium wages independently of the equilibrium wealth distribution. Krusell et al. (2010) show that,
when firms’ bargaining power is positive, wealth affects only the wages of workers very close to the
borrowing limit. Furthermore, the effect is small and hardly relevant for wage dispersion.
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an idiosyncratic productivity shock that renders the match unproductive.12 If hit by the
shock, the firm lays its worker off, paying a severance payment—a one-off transfer—θs if
the worker is entitled to it. The severance payment is a non-negative function θs = γtws
of the last wage. Such specification allows the severance payment to depend both on
productivity εs and on tenure length t.
13
Other market arrangements: The final good market and the rental market for physical
capital are competitive.
There are no state-contingent markets to insure against unemployment and income
risk, but there is a competitive banking sector that: 1) takes deposits from and lends to
consumers at the risk-free rate r; 2) holds firms and physical capital and rents the latter
to firms.
Consumers’ borrowing is subject to a limit, denoted by d ≥ 0. There are perfect
annuity markets where retired workers share their mortality risk.
Government: Unemployed workers are entitled to unemployment benefits upon job loss,
but lose benefit entitlement with probability pib. The unemployment benefit for a worker
of type s whose benefits have not expired is given by $1s = RRws,
14 where RR is the
benefit replacement rate. Unemployed workers of type s whose benefits have expired still
receive a flow $0s = g of the consumption good, which can be thought of as a safety net
policy (e.g., food stamps).
Finally, retired workers receive a pension income yp.
The government balances the budget in every period by levying a proportional labor
income tax τ on employed consumers to finance the unemployment insurance scheme,
12There is a large body of evidence, discussed for example in Gottschalk and Moffitt (1999) and
Neumark et al. (1999), showing that workers’ retention probabilities are significantly affected by a set of
observables, such as age and tenure. Age and tenure specific separation rates help in fitting the tenure
and unemployment distributions, and the unemployment rates over the life cycle.
13The ratio between severance pay and wages is indeed increasing in tenure for most OECD countries.
14In reality, unemployment benefits are usually proportional to the last wage. Since, s may change if
the worker ages over the course of an unemployment spell, our formulation makes benefits a function
of the wage a worker would have received in the current period had her tenure been the same as at
the time of job loss. In the numerical model, making the severance payment proportional to the last
wage would have further increased the dimension of the state space. Given the much larger probability of
unemployment-employment rather than age transitions, the number of age transitions among unemployed
workers is negligible.
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the safety net program and the pay-as-you-go pension system.
2.2. Consumers
2.2.1. Employed consumers
Let Ve(s, a) denote the value function of an employed consumer of type s = (i, t) with
current assets a while Vu(s, b, a) denotes the value function of an unemployed consumer
of type s, with benefit entitlement status b and current assets a. Finally, Vr(a) denotes
the value function of a retired consumer.
To streamline notation, we denote by pi(ς ′|ς) the generic transition probability from
the current value ς of a state variable to some future value ς ′. The recursive representation
of the problem of an employed consumer can then be written as
Ve(s, a) = max
c,a′
u(c) + βρiVr(a
′) + β(1− ρi)× (1)[
(1− σs)
∑
s′
pi(s′|s)Ve(s′, a′) + σs
∑
i′
pi(i′|i)Vu(s′, 1, a′ + θs)
]
s.t. c+ a′ = (1 + r) a+ (1− τ)ws a′ ≥ −d.
Employed agents receive a post-tax wage (1− τ)ws, choose current consumption and face
several uncertain events in the future. They retire with probability ρi. With probability
(1− ρi)(1− σs) they remain in employment and may undergo a stochastic age or tenure
transition. With probability (1−ρi)σs they lose their job and enter unemployment being
entitled to benefits, with a severance payment θs, and s
′ = (i′, t); namely job losers may
undergo an age but not a tenure transition. Hence the summation over i′ in the last term
in the square bracket.
2.2.2. Unemployed consumers
The problem of unemployed agents of type s and benefit-entitlement status b can be
represented as follows
Vu (s, b, a) = max
c,a′,ψ
u(c)− vψ + βρiVr(a′) + β(1− ρi)× (2)[
φ(ψ)
∑
i′
pi(i′|i)Ve(i′, 0, a′) + (1− φ(ψ))
∑
i′,b′
pi(i′, b′|i, b)Vu(s′, b′, a′)
]
s.t. c+ a′ = (1 + r) a+$bs, a
′ ≥ −d.
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Unemployed agents choose optimally both their consumption/savings plans and whether
to participate in the labor market in the current period. They may retire with probability
ρi. Alternatively, if they participate—ψ = 1—they find a job with probability φ(1) and
become employed at the lowest tenure level. Workers who are entitled to benefits—
$1s = RRws— may also experience a change in the level of benefits either because of an
age transition or because of benefit expiration.
2.2.3. Retired consumers
The problem of retired agents can be represented as follows
Vr (a) = max
c,a′
u(c) + β(1− pid)Vr(a′) (3)
s.t. c+ a′ =
(
1 + r
1− pid
)
a+ yp, a
′ ≥ −d.
Agents receive pension income yp, and the rate of return on their saving reflects the
actuarially fair insurance against their survival risk.
2.2.4. Firms
Firms maximize the present discounted value of profits. In every period, after wages
have been set, the value of a firm matched to a worker of type s satisfies
J (s) = max
ks
f(ks)εs − ws − (r + δ) ksεs + 1− ρi
1 + r
[
(1− σs)
∑
s′
pi(s′|s)J(s′)− σsθs
]
. (4)
Similarly to equation (1), the firm’s Bellman equation takes into account all possible
transitions the currently employed worker can go through. Free entry implies that the
firm’s payoff equals zero if the match is destroyed due to the worker’s retirement, as
retiring workers are not entitled to severance pay.15
Constant returns to scale imply all firms use the same stock of capital k per efficiency
unit of labor satisfying the first order condition
f ′(k) = r + δ. (5)
2.2.5. Wage determination
In each period, the wage solves the Nash bargaining problem
max
ws
(Ve(s, a)− Vu(s, b, a))ζ J(s)1−ζ .
15This formulation of the Bellman equation already substitutes the equilibrium, free-entry condition.
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This is the same bargaining solution used in Krusell et al. (2010). Contrary to Alvarez
and Veracierto (2001), but in line with the standard matching literature, it implies that
wages are privately efficient, subject to the constraint that bargaining is over spot wages
rather than contracts.16 It also assumes that severance pay does not affect the parties’
bargaining threat points.17
It is straightforward to verify that in the limit when the worker’s bargaining weight ζ
converges to one, the equilibrium value of a productive match J(s) goes to zero. Hence,
it follows from equation (4) that ws satisfies
ws = f(k)εs − (r + δ) kεs − 1− ρi
1 + r
σsθs. (6)
The wage falls by the actuarially-fair value of the expected layoff transfer (full-bonding).18
3. Parameterization
We calibrate the model to data for male workers in the US economy, where there
are no mandated severance packages. In order to properly capture the labor market
dynamics, we work with a short time period; namely, one model period corresponds to
two months.
In what follows, we first comment upon the choice of parameters set outside the
model and then discuss those whose calibration requires solving for the equilibrium. All
parameters are reported in Table 1. We assume that newborns enter the economy without
any asset endowment, or a0 = 0. The CRRA coefficient η is set to 2.0, a common value
in the literature (see, e.g. Attanasio, 1999)
[Table 1 about here]
16With risk-averse workers and risk-neutral firms, bargaining over spot wages is only constrained-
efficient as it is Pareto dominated by bargaining over contracts. The assumption keeps separate the
insurance role of, exogenously-given, severance pay from that of more general, optimal contracting.
17This is the natural assumption for bargaining with new hires (‘outsiders’), as severance pay is not
due if a contact between a firm and a worker is not turned into a match. Section 5 discusses why, in our
environment, it is the more reasonable assumption even for ongoing matches.
18It follows that, at constant interest rate, severance pay does not affect the shadow cost of labor.
Section 5 discusses how wage flexibility is sufficient for severance pay to have negligible effects on the
allocation of labor even with endogenous contact and destruction rates.
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The age grid has 10 points each corresponding to a five-year age bracket. Workers
enter the economy at age 18-22 and reach at most age 63-67. It follows that pii = 0.033
for all i < I. We specify the retirement probability as ρi = 0 for all ages between 18 and
47, and ρi = 0.02 for the remaining ages. This parameter is calibrated for the model to
match the median age observed in the US labor force (39 years). The pensioners’ death
probability is set to pid = 0.0238, which matches the US Census share of (male) retirees
of 15.6%.
The tenure grid goes has 11, equally-spaced, points each corresponding to a two-year
interval between 0-2 and 20+. On average workers in continuous employment experience
an increase in tenure every 2 years. It follows that pit = 0.083.
The unemployment benefit replacement rate is set to RR = 0.5, and the probability
of losing benefit eligibility is set to pib = 0.333 which implies an average benefit duration
of six months. These values capture unemployment benefit rules in place in several US
states. Transfers to unemployed workers who have lost eligibility are set to a $0s = 0.077,
which corresponds to a monthly payment of approximately $140. This value matches
the average transfer observed for households receiving food stamps in the US in 1996,
according to USDA (2014).
Pension income yp is set so as to imply a pension replacement rate equal to 0.394 of
average earnings, which is the value found in OECD (2011). The borrowing constraint
d is the natural one–the value of food stamps capitalized at the market interest rate—
and equals around 12 times average post-tax wages. Finally, γt = 0 in the benchmark
economy consistent with the absence of mandated severance pay in the US.
The capital depreciation rate is set to δ = 0.017 which implies an investment/output
share of about 20%, on an annual basis. We assume a Cobb-Douglas production function,
with capital share equal to α = 0.3.
The labor market statistics rely on CPS data for the period 1996-2006 and, in order
to be consistent with the model, we restrict our analysis to workers between the ages of
18 and 67.
The job finding probability for searching workers is set to φ(1) = 0.524 to match an
average unemployment duration of about 16 weeks in our target population.
The profile of efficiency units εs for s = (i, t) is estimated using CPS data.
19 We
19In the US also the NLSY and the PSID contain information on age and job tenure. The advantage of
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start by estimating a simple linear regression by OLS, where the dependent variable
is the natural logarithm of earnings and the set of explanatory variables are a second-
degree polynomial in age and tenure and year dummies. Notice that, in order to preserve
consistency between the theoretical model and the data, we transformed the dependent
variable and the explanatory ones to the same time period of the model, that is we
estimated log-wages on a bimonthly basis. Table 2 reports the results of both an OLS and
a Tobit regression. The Tobit specification, taking into consideration the right censoring
in the data due to top-coding, gives virtually the same estimates. With the estimated
parameters, we retrieve the {εs} as the fitted values of the econometric model at all the
pairs of the respective mid-points of our tenure and age bins.
Although our estimation procedure does not deal with the likely pervasive selection
and endogeneity problems, it implies an estimated average return to tenure of approxi-
mately 2% on a yearly basis. This value is in the middle of existing estimates of returns to
tenure. At the low end of the spectrum, Altonji and Williams (2005) reconcile the large
discrepancies in the seminal studies of returns to tenure by Abraham and Farber (1987),
Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and Topel (1991) and report a return of 1.1-1.4% per year
as their preferred estimate for the PSID. Yamaguchi (2010) estimates a similar value for
the rate of job-specific wage growth associated with employers matching of outside offers
in the NLSY79. At the upper end of the spectrum, Buchinsky et al. (2010) find a yearly
average return of approximately 5% for the first ten years in the PSID. Dustmann and
Meghir (2005) estimate a yearly return of 4% for unskilled and 2.4% for skilled workers
in the first five year of tenure and respectively 1.1 and 1.7% thereafter, using German
administrative data.
[Table 2 about here]
The remaining parameters are chosen to minimize the sum of squared deviations of a
set of simulated moments from their data counterparts. The job destruction probability is
assumed to depend on age and tenure according to σs = σ·exp {−σi · (i− 1)− (σ0t + σ1t It>2) · (t− 1)},
where σ, σi, σ
0
t and σ
1
t are parameters to be calibrated. σ represents the common starting
value for the job separation probability (for the young and untenured workers), while the
the CPS is that it is a random sample of the whole US labor force, unlike the NLSY that contains infor-
mation on only one cohort and the PSID that provides a tenure measure contaminated by measurement
error, as discussed for example in Altonji and Williams (2005).
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other three parameters allow for increasing job retention probabilities for workers that
are older and/or with higher seniority.
The four parameters (σ, σi, σ
0
t and σ
1
t ), together with the disutility of search effort v
and the rate of time preference β are calibrated with an over-identified moment-matching
procedure. It is implemented with more moments (33) than unknown parameters (6).
The moments we match are an annual interest rate of 4% and 32 moments from the
CPS; namely, the tenure distribution of the employed, the age distribution of the labor
force, the profile of unemployment rates over the life cycle, and the ratio of the number
non-participants—v = 0—to that of searching unemployed workers—v = 1. The target
for this last moment is 0.06. This is the share, relative to the unemployed population,
of the number of workers that report having looked for work in the previous year—but
not in the previous four weeks—and and that do not report being discouraged.20 This
target effectively identifies the search cost. Since, for tractability, the model lacks an
intensive search margin, targeting a category of workers that are marginally attached—
as opposed unambiguously out the labor force—has the aim of ensuring a meaningful,
extensive-margin response of the number of active searchers to changes in policy.
The calibrated parameter values are σ = 0.042, σi = 0.035, σ
0
t = 0.094,σ
1
t = 0.009,
β = 0.998 and v = 3.735.21 The job separation profiles imply a monthly mean separation
rate of 0.015. This is the same value used in Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) and is line
with Fallick and Fleischman’s (2004) estimates from the CPS over our sample 1996-2006
period.
4. Numerical analysis
4.1. Further properties of the calibrated economy
Although the parameterization is quite parsimonious, the calibration achieves a very
good fit. The four panels in Figure 1 plot the data (the solid black line) against the model
(the dashed blue line) statistics for the target marginal distributions of workers by age,
employment status and tenure.
[Figure 1 about here]
20The formal CPS category is marginally attached workers who are not discouraged.
21The complete list of targets and moments generated by the model, are reported in Table A.8 in the
Appendix.
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As for the age distribution of the labor force, plotted in panel 1, the model captures
well the decline in the shares of older workers, while it misses the non-monotonic behavior
for younger ones. The errors, though, are relatively small.
Panel 2 plots the distribution of current tenure for employed workers. The model
captures well the main patterns, both qualitatively and quantitatively. In particular,
three important features of the data are accounted for: the high share of jobs with less
than two years of tenure, the smoothly decreasing share of workers employed at increasing
levels of tenure, and the high share of jobs lasting for at least 20 years.22 The model
somewhat misses, though, the sharp decline moving from less than two to less than four
years of tenure.
Panel 3 plots the age distribution of the unemployed distributions, while panel 4 the
unemployment rates over the life-cycle. The model overestimates the share of young
unemployed, while it matches almost perfectly the unemployment rates until age 50. As
for Panel 4, also in this case age and tenure dependent separation rates are instrumental
to achieve a good fit.
Finally, a crucial—and untargeted—ingredient of our quantitative analysis is the size
of earnings losses associated with displacement. Following the seminal contribution of
Jacobson et al. (1993), a growing body of research has exploited program evaluation
techniques applied to administrative data to identify the causal effect of job displacement
on earnings. The study with the most comprehensive coverage is Davis and von Wachter
(2011) (DV in what follows), using annual Social Security records for all U.S. states from
1974 to 2008. To compare our simulated data to their empirical estimates, we aggregate
our simulated bi-monthly wage series into annual earnings and estimate the following
equation which is equivalent to equation (1) in DV.
eyit = ι
y
i + f(ageit) +
20∑
j=−6
ξyjD
j
it + u
y
it, (7)
where y is a separation year, the outcome variable eyit denotes yearly earnings for in-
dividual i in year t, ιyi is an individual fixed effect, f(ageit) is a quartic polynomial in
age and Djit are dummies equal to one in the j-th year before or after displacement for
the treatment group of workers displaced in year y and zero otherwise. We follow DV
22With a constant separation rate over age and tenure the model would miss the first and third
characteristics.
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and restrict attention to workers aged less than 50 with at least 3 years of tenure in the
current job.23 The sequence of coefficients ξyj then captures the (absolute) change in earn-
ings j years after the displacement year relative to the control group of non-separators.
Similarly, estimating equation (7) using average wages (i.e., average earnings conditional
on employment) rather than earnings as the dependent variable returns a measure of
post-displacement wage losses. Wages losses capture the contribution to earnings losses
of the loss of human capital. The difference between earnings and wage losses is ac-
counted for by the post-displacement fall in employment, the result of post-displacement
unemployment incidence and average unemployment duration. Unemployment incidence
is initially higher after a displacement event, as separation rates are decreasing in tenure
both in the model and in the data.
The solid line in Panel 1 in Figure 2 plots the earnings losses in the model against
the losses estimated by DV for workers displaced as part of a mass layoff, respectively, in
expansions and recessions. Qualitatively, the model captures rather well the time profile
of losses,24 but implies a much faster recovery in the second post-displacement year,
and lower afterwards. Therefore, our estimated tenure profile of productivity implies
substantially conservative earnings losses compared to the estimates in DV. The dashed
line plots wages losses in the model. Wages fall very little in the separation year, because
most employment in that year is pre-displacement. Instead, wages in the first post-
displacement year are associated with re-employment and are roughly 15% lower than
counterfactual wages. The 10 percentage points difference between the earnings loss and
the wage loss reflects both the incidence of subsequent separations from post-displacement
jobs and the average duration of unemployment. Two years after displacement, though,
earnings losses are due to the persistent reduction in wages rather than in hours. These
findings are consistent with Stevens (1997), Altonji et al. (2013) and Huckfeldt (2016)
who also find a similar fast convergence of earnings and wages for the PSID. Intuitively,
though unemployment incidence increases with the loss of pre-displacement tenure, given
an average unemployment duration of one quarter in the US, the contribution of higher
23DV consider workers displaced as part of a mass layoff (defined as a lasting decline in firm-level
employment of at least 30%) to control for selection.
24The difference between the model and the data in year zero, the displacement year, is due to the
fact that DV average over three adjacent years (see their fn. 12) to smooth the timing issues highlighted
in Stevens (1997).
16
post-displacement separation rates declines very quickly.25
Panel 2 plots compares earnings losses in the model with estimates from another in-
fluential, recent study by Couch and Placzek (2010) (CP), using quarterly administrative
data for Connecticut from 1993 to 2004. CP estimate quarterly, average earnings losses
for workers with at least 6 years of pre-displacement tenure, aged between 20 and 50. We
report losses for this group of workers in the model26 (solid line) against the estimates in
CP for, respectively, workers displaced as part of a mass layoff (dashed-dotted line) and
all separators claiming unemployment insurance (dotted line).
[Figure 2 about here]
Comparing earnings losses for the various groups in CP reveals that losses are sub-
stantially larger for separators who claim UI benefits. Intuitively, separations resulting in
UI claims do not include voluntary quits to unemployment and job-to-job transitions—
which, at least the latter, are likely to entail substantially lower average losses.27 This
also explains why the average losses estimated by CP are considerably smaller than those
reported in DV even for workers displaced in expansions and with at least 3 rather than
6 years of tenure. The relevant period considered by CP features an unusually low unem-
ployment rate (3.8% on average) and a proportion of UI claimants among job losers of
36%.28 As a reference, DV document that only 23% of all years from 1980 to 2005 had an
unemployment rate below 5% and the average incidence of UI claims among unemploy-
ment entrants is about 0.5 according to Figure 14 in Song and von Wachter (2014). DV’s
estimates (Table 1, p. 22 in their paper) imply a 1.6 ratio between the present value (over
20 years and as a fraction of pre-displacement earnings) of the average loss for workers
displaced in years with an unemployment rate below 5% and the unconditional average
25This findings contrasts with Jarosch (2015), who finds a much slower convergence of wages and
earnings using German data. The difference can easily be reconciled once one notes that the the unem-
ployment exit rate in the German economy is nearly one third of the US one (0.09 per month instead of
0.26).
26Quarterly losses in the model are obtained from linear interpolation of half-yearly losses.
27Given that all workers in the sample have more than one year of pre-displacement tenure, the most
likely reason for benefit ineligibility is that the separation does not involve an involuntary entry into
unemployment.
28CP argue that differences in economic conditions and, in particular in the incidence of UI recipients,
are “...the primary factor that underlies differences...” between their estimates and the much larger
earnings losses estimated by Jacobson et al. (1993) for Pennsylvania in 74-86.
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loss. For this reason, we plot the losses in the model both unadjusted (solid black line)
and scaled down by 1.6 (solid black line with triangles). Again, the model captures rea-
sonably well the profile of the empirical estimates. The (unadjusted) losses in the model
are substantially below the estimates for UI claimants, but than those estimated by CP
both for mass layoffs. On the other hand, the rescaled losses are below even the lowest
set of estimates.29
To sum up, taking into account the above discussion about the representativeness of
the CP sample period, together with the fact that the population of displaced workers in
the data, but not in the model, includes job-to-job quitters, it seems safe to conclude that
if anything the model generates rather conservative earnings losses relative to the data.
Therefore the gains from insurance in the model are likely to provide a lower bound for
the actual gains.
4.2. Quantitative effects of severance pay
4.2.1. Benchmark economy
This section discusses the allocational and welfare effects of introducing severance pay
in the benchmark economy.
In assessing the welfare consequences of any policy change one should ideally take
into account the transition path to the new steady state. This is a very costly compu-
tational task in our environment, as it requires tracing the equilibrium sequence of the
rate of return on capital, average wage and labor income tax along the transition. For
this reason, we restrict attention to a comparison of steady states. We report welfare
effects according to two different welfare criteria in order to facilitate relating our results
to the existing literature. The first is the one used in Hansen and I˙mrohorog˘lu (1992) and
Rogerson and Schindler (2002). It measures welfare changes as the fraction—constant
across time and contingencies—by which consumption in the benchmark economy would
have to be scaled to equalize the lifetime utility of a newborn in the benchmark economy
to the utility of a newborn in the counterfactual economy.30 The second welfare criterion
averages the heterogeneous individual gains in lifetime utility associated with switching
29The dashed line plots wage losses in the model. Even for workers with more than 6 years of tenure,
earnings and wage losses converge within two years from the first displacement event.
30Since newborns have zero assets, our choice of a natural borrowing limit was dictated by the desire
to minimize the impact of wealth at birth on this welfare measure.
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from the benchmark to the counterfactual economy (keeping constant each individual’s
state) where the weights are given by the steady-state, cross-sectional distribution in the
benchmark economy. The welfare gain is the fraction—cost-ant across time, contingen-
cies and individuals—by which consumption in the benchmark economy would have to
be scaled for the average gain to be zero.31 This average welfare criterion is used, for
example, in Chatterjee et al. (2007) and is comparable to the one employed by Alvarez
and Veracierto (2001).32
In most countries, levels of both privately-negotiated and mandated severance pay
increase linearly with job tenure, subject possibly to a maximum limit (see, e.g., OECD,
2013; Parsons, 2013). Table A.9 in the Appendix reports levels of statutory severance
pay for three different levels of tenure for a number of OECD countries. Since our aim
is to quantify the effect of realistic measures, we study the effect of severance payments
that are linear in tenure. In particular, we consider severance payments equal to 0.3, 0.6,
0.9 and 1.2 months of the last wage per each year of tenure.33 These values span most of
the spectrum from the least (UK) to the most restrictive (Spain) country.
[Table 3 about here]
Table 3 reports the allocational and welfare effects of introducing severance payments—
columns 3 to 6—compared to the employment-at-will benchmark economy in column
2.34
Severance pay marginally increases the number of non-participants, as job losers have
higher assets compared to the baseline economy. The unemployment rate also marginally
increases as the reduction in the number of searchers is concentrated among relatively
older, wealthier workers. Since the probability of losing one’s job is decreasing in age,
31This average welfare criterion can be seen as either trading off (according to a utilitarian social welfare
function) distributional effects across ex post heterogeneous individuals or as evaluating expected lifetime
utility under the veil of ignorance of not knowing when in the cross-sectional distribution one would be
placed.
32To the best of our understanding Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) weigh allocations in the counterfac-
tual economy by the steady-state distribution in the counterfactual, rather than the benchmark, economy.
We have verified that there is little difference in using their rather than our ex post measure.
33We evaluate the severance payment for a job losers at the mid-point of her tenure bin.
34The quantities with no meaningful unit of measurement, namely output, consumption and welfare,
are reported as a percentage of their values in the benchmark economy.
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the fall in the average age of (searching) unemployed, and therefore also of employed,
workers marginally increases the average job destruction and unemployment rates.
Severance pay also reduces precautionary saving and therefore the supply of assets.
It follows that the equilibrium capital stock35 and output fall. Consumption follows a
pattern similar to output, but its variability is substantially reduced. The fall in the asset
supply, and therefore, in output and consumption is not monotonic though. As severance
pay increases from 0.9 to 1.2 months per year of tenure, the asset supply increases as the
average worker is overinsured and increases saving. The fall in consumption variability,
though, is substantial and monotonic, more than compensating for the fall in aggregate
consumption relative to laissez-faire. As a result welfare increases and the increase is
significant, ranging from 0.3 to 1 percentage point with minor differences between the
two welfare metrics.
In order to understand what drives the welfare gains it is useful to decompose them
into a pure insurance—at constant interest rate—effect and the effect associated with the
general equilibrium response of the interest rate and the capital stock. The general equi-
librium increase in the interest rate has two implications. On the one hand, it increases
the cost of capital to firms and reduces output and wages, reducing workers’ welfare. On
the other hand, it increases the return to saving which is welfare-increasing for savers
but welfare-reducing for, the mostly young, borrowers. Table 4 reports the results for the
same policy change, but at constant interest rate. Comparing the welfare changes with
their counterparts in Table 3 reveals that the general equilibrium increase in the interest
rate offsets roughly one third of the pure insurance, partial equilibrium, welfare gains.
[Table 4 about here]
In a related paper, Rogerson and Schindler (2002) compute the welfare costs of dis-
placement risk; namely the risk of persistent wage loss. They consider an economy
without unemployment and model displacement as a one-off, permanent fall in workers’
productivity. On the basis of the estimates in Jacobson et al. (1993), they parameterize
displacement risk as a 0.25 probability of a permanent 30 per cent fall in the intercept of
35The difference between the capital stock and the aggregate supply of assets in tables 3-7 is the
aggregate value of firms which is negative in the economy with severance pay. A negative aggregate
value of firms is consistent with a competitive banking sector, since wages ensure that the internal rate
of return on new firms coincides with the market interest rate.
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the labor income process at age 45. They compute the benefits of completely eliminating
such risk and argue that this can be achieved by a one-off payment (severance pay) to
displaced workers equal to about four years of pre-displacement wages. For our chosen
value of the CRRA coefficient—η = 2—their results imply a welfare gain, measured from
the perspective of a newborn, of about 0.5 percentage points at constant interest rate
and 0.3 in general equilibrium.36
In our framework a severance payment of 1.2 months per year of tenure—i.e., on av-
erage 7.2 months of wages, against their four years—implies substantially larger gains.
The main difference is due to the fact that, although our model features a lower displace-
ment risk at age 46 and earnings losses that are persistent but not permanent, it features
ongoing risk in every period. This cumulates to a larger overall risk and implies welfare
gains that are three times as large as those computed by Rogerson and Schindler (2002).
4.2.2. No tenure effects
The purpose of our model has been to isolate the welfare gains from the pure insurance
role of severance pay. In this sense, the gains we find are additional to the gains associated
with the firing tax component of severance pay in the presence of downward rigid wages
identified in Alvarez and Veracierto (2001).37 Yet, the welfare gains we compute may,
at first, appear surprising in the light of Alvarez and Veracierto’s (2001) findings that
the welfare gains from the pure-transfer (what they call the “unemployment-insurance”)
component of severance pay are negligible in general, and negative for values of severance
pay exceeding three months of wages (see their Section 5.2, in particular tables 4 and 5).
Our model is indeed close to Alvarez and Veracierto (2001). The main difference
is that in their model there are no returns to job tenure; the only risk associated with
job loss is that of transiting temporarily through unemployment. To understand the
36These numbers are obtained by linearly interpolating the welfare gains when η = 1.5 and η = 3 in
Rogerson and Schindler (2002). Their partial equilibrium welfare gains are indeed linear in the CRRA
coefficient, but the general equilibrium gains are less than linear. In this sense, 0.3 is an overestimate of
the general equilibrium gains in their model for η = 2.
37As pointed out by Ljungqvist (2002), the sizable welfare gains from the introduction of severance pay
in Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) do not stem from market incompleteness, but from the assumption that
job loss is involuntary due to downward wage rigidity. As shown by Fella (2000), in such an environment,
severance pay increase welfare and efficiency by making firms internalize workers’ cost of involuntary job
loss.
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quantitative importance of the loss of tenure we simulate our model by shutting down
the tenure-related component of productivity. The results are reported in Table 5 and
are very much in line with those in Table 5 in Alvarez and Veracierto (2001), featuring
endogenous search effort. Small values of severance pay marginally reduce consumption
variability and saving. For larger values, consumption variability and saving eventually
increase as unemployed workers are overinsured and unemployed agents save to finance
consumption during employment. According to the average welfare metric, which is the
counterpart of that used in Alvarez and Veracierto (2001), the welfare gains are zero or
negative and very similar in magnitude to those they find.
[Table 5 about here]
In fact the comparison of the average post welfare gains in our Table 3 and Table 5
reveals that the differential gains from providing insurance against persistent earnings
losses are even larger than the net gains in Table 3. Intuitively, in the absence of persistent
earnings losses, the job loss risk faced by the average individual is easily insured given
the duration of the average unemployment spell. On the other hand, the loss of tenure
associated with displacement is persistent for two reasons. First, the higher the tenure in
the previous job the longer it takes to rebuild it in the new match, even conditionally on
the match surviving. Second, the probability of job loss is decreasing in tenure. Therefore,
the average welfare gains from insuring against displacement risk are sizable.
From the perspective of a newborn, though, the gains from severance pay are half
as large relative to the case in which wages increase with tenure, but still positive. For
a newborn the insurance provided by severance pay is more valuable than for the aver-
age individual, as young individuals hold less assets and have a higher desire to bring
consumption forward, given that wages increase with age.
The important message from these results is that, to the extent that it generates
counterfactually small and transitory earnings losses from displacement, the standard
search literature substantially underestimates the potential benefits of insurance against
job loss.
[Table 6 about here]
A related question is how much of the welfare losses from displacement stem from
the fact that unemployment incidence is higher post-displacement. We address this ques-
tion by studying an environment in which productivity increases with tenure, as in the
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benchmark, but separation rates are now tenure-independent. We maintain the same
separation rate as in the benchmark economy. Table 6 reports the effects of introducing
severance pay in such an environment. Comparing it to Table 3 reveals that the wel-
fare and allocational effects are effectively identical to those in our calibrated economy.
Keeping the average separation rate constant, the effect of a higher separation rate post-
displacement is negligible. The intuition is that the implications of higher separation
rates post-displacement are transitory, as we have shown in Section 4, and workers can
easily self-insure against. This is not the case with the much more persistent wage losses
associated with the loss of tenure.
4.2.3. Tenure-independent severance pay
The previous section has made clear how the gains from severance pay revolve around
the persistence of displacement losses. Both these losses and their persistence are higher
for workers with higher tenure. This seems to call for insurance against job loss to
be increasing in tenure. To verify this hypothesis we simulate the model under the
assumption that severance pay is independent of tenure. For comparability we impose
that the average severance pay is the same as in the counterpart economy with linear
severance pay considered in Section 4.2.1. Given an average completed job tenure of 6
years, this implies a severance pay of 1.8, 3.6, 5.4 and 7.2 months, respectively.
Table 7 reports the results. Comparing them to those in Table 3 suggests that, from
the perspective of a newborn, these effects are negligible as they accrue into the future.
Yet, measured from the perspective of the average individual, welfare gains are between
15 and 20 per cent larger in the economy in which severance pay increases linearly with
tenure.
[Table 7 about here]
This result may provide a rationale for the stylized fact that both privately negotiated
and mandated severance pay is indeed increasing in tenure in most countries (Parsons
2013).
5. Discussion
This paper focuses on measuring the insurance benefits of severance pay when job
displacement implies persistent earnings losses and markets are incomplete. To this
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effect we have concentrated our efforts on carefully modeling the various aspects of job
loss risk, namely its evolution over tenure and age, and purposefully abstracted from
other potential roles of severance pay.
In line with most of the matching literature, the assumption that wage setting is
privately (constrained-) efficient, and therefore wages are flexible at the match level,
distinguishes this paper from Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) who emphasize the sizable
welfare gains associated with the (Pigouvian) tax role of severance pay when wages are
downward-rigid in the face of idiosyncratic productivity shocks.38 Assuming wage flexi-
bility abstracts from this mechanism and our welfare gains are additional to those they
find.
As first pointed out by Lazear (1990), severance pay is in fact neutral if wages are
flexible and asset markets complete. Complete asset markets are not crucial for this result
as long as bargaining is efficient, as shown by Fella and Tyson (2013).39
The assumption that workers have all the bargaining power in wage negotiations still
implies efficient bargaining, but substantially simplifies the model computation. If firms
had positive bargaining power, the distribution of wages would depend on the workers’
asset distribution, as shown in Krusell et al.’s (2010) version of Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994) with CRRA preferences, period-by-period wage bargaining with symmetric weights
and endogenous interest rate. Reassuringly, Krusell et al. (2010) find that the dependence
of wages on workers’ asset position does not have quantitatively significant effects. We
have actually verified that introducing a severance payment up to 6 months of wages in
the steady-state version of Krusell et al. (2010) has a negligible impact on the equilibrium
allocation of labor and the interest rate.40
In a nutshell, privately (constrained-)efficient wage setting implies that severance
38In fact, if wages are downward rigid, the tax role of severance pay is welfare improving even under
complete markets (see Fella, 2000).
39While Fella and Tyson (2013) assume that workers have CARA preferences and borrowing is un-
constrained, the same result holds in an earlier version with CRRA preferences and hand-to-mouth
workers.
40In particular, a severance payment equal to six months of wages increases the aggregate capital stock
by 0.14%, and the unemployment rate by 0.02 percentage points. Results are available upon request. We
were not able to obtain convergence for higher value of the severance pay. Moreover, introducing wage
and tenure effects in Krusell et al.’s (2010) model would have entailed a functional fixed point problem
with as many wage schedules as worker types (110 in our case), which is computationally intractable.
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pay are near-neutral, independently from whether asset markets are complete and the
particular value of workers’ bargaining power. Therefore, our assumption that severance
pay does not affect the firm-level dynamics—namely the job destruction rate and job
finding rate for searching workers— not only buys us substantial tractability, but is in
fact consistent with the implications of wage flexibility.
While the assumption that severance pay does not affect threat points when bargain-
ing with new hires (‘outsiders’) is a natural and common one, the literature entertains
two different assumptions on how severance pay affects wages for continuing workers who
have matured entitlement to it (‘insiders’). The first one (see Mortensen and Pissarides,
1999) implicitly maintains that insider workers are able to unilaterally secure severance
pay in case of disagreement. As a result, a severance payment θ reduces the firm’s and
increases the worker’s bargaining threat point. Effectively, insider workers receive the
severance pay with probability one: either as a wage premium equal to the annuity value
rθ or as a transfer θ upon separation.41 The alternative assumption (see Ljungqvist,
2002) is that severance pay affects wages only indirectly but not, directly, through the
bargaining threat points. This is consistent with the point made by Binmore et al. (1986)
that the appropriate threat points are the parties’ expected payoffs in case of perpetual
disagreement and not the payoffs that the parties would obtain by irreversibly breaking
the match to trade outside (outside options). Applications of this insight are Hall and
Milgrom (2008) and the wage renegotiation framework introduced by MacLeod and Mal-
comson (1993) and used in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and their subsequent work.
This is also the route we follow here.
If workers are risk-neutral, Ljungqvist (2002) shows that the two assumptions are
equivalent, the only difference being a backloading of payments from firms to workers in
the case in which severance pay are paid in case of a breakdown in bargaining. If workers
are risk-averse, though, this equivalence no longer holds. As in Alvarez and Veracierto
(2001), under our assumption severance pay can potentially provide insurance. In the
alternative case, though, the purely deterministic backloading of payments is either fully
undone—if Ricardian equivalence applies—or reduces insurance—if, as in our framework,
41If workers are risk neutral, this is true independently of their bargaining power ( Mortensen and
Pissarides, 1999). If workers are risk averse, it can be shown analytically that it is still true if workers’
bargaining power is zero or one.
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Ricardian equivalence fails. Among the many possible bargaining protocols, the one
assuming that severance pay is due in case of a breakdown in bargaining is the only one
that delivers this counter-intuitive result. This lack of generality and the related argument
in Binmore et al. (1986) that, whenever there is ambiguity about the appropriate threat
points one should get guidance by modeling the bargaining process strategically, induced
us not to pursue this alternative route in the paper.42
6. Conclusion
This paper has provided a quantitative equilibrium framework to study the insurance
properties of severance payments when markets are incomplete and workers’ job displace-
ment risk includes the kind of sizable and persistent earnings documented, for example, in
Couch and Placzek (2010) and the literature they survey. Our focus has been to carefully
model the various aspects of job loss risk while abstracting from other potential roles of
the severance pay emphasized in previous literature.
We find that the introduction of severance pay entails sizable welfare gains. These
gains are due to the difficulty of self-insuring against the persistent earnings loss upon
displacement stemming from the loss of job-specific human. In line with existing studies,
we find that severance pay reduces average welfare if the only cost of job displacement
is the transitory income loss associated with transiting through unemployment. The
average welfare gain we find is higher if severance pay is an increasing function of tenure,
consistently with observed privately-negotiated and mandated severance packages.
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Value Source/Target
Value of assigned parameters
Newborns’ asset endowment a0 0 –
CRRA coefficient η 2.0 Attanasio (1999)
Age (i = 1, 2, . . . , 10) transition pii 0.033 A jump every 5 years
Retirement prob. ρi 0 (i < 50); Median age of workers
0.02 (i ≥ 50)
Pensioners’ death prob. pid 0.0238 % of retirees ≈ 16% (Census)
Tenure (t = 1, 2, . . . , 11) transition pit 0.083 A jump every 2 years
UI benefit replacement rate RR 0.5 Avg. replacement rate
UI benefit loss prob. pib 0.333 Avg. time limit 6 months
Food stamps g 0.077 Avg. transfer ($140/m) (USDA 2014)
Pension yp 0.394 ∗ w¯ OECD (2011)
Severance Payments γt 0 Employment at will
Capital share α 0.3 NIPA
Capital depreciation rate δ 0.017 I/Y = 0.22 (NIPA)
Job finding prob. φ(1) 0.52 Un. duration ≈ 16.4w (CPS)
εs - Productivity values See Table 2 Regression on CPS data
Borrowing limit d – Natural borrowing limit
Value of calibrated parameters
Disutility of search effort v 3.735 0.06 - ratio of marginally-attached
to unemployed workers (CPS)
Job losing prob. baseline σ 0.042 Unemployment/tenure moments (CPS)
Job losing prob. tenure gradient σ0t 0.094 ”
Job losing prob. tenure gradient σ1t 0.009 ”
Job losing prob. age gradient σi 0.035 Unemployment/age moments (CPS)
Discount factor β 0.998 4% - annual interest rate
Table 1: Parameter values in the benchmark economy
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Parameter OLS (CPS) Tobit (CPS) OLS (Model)
Age .0262816 .0263248 .0257998
(.00055) (.0004587) −
Age2 −.0000507 −.0000508 −.0000497
(1.22e− 06) (9.92e− 07) −
Age∗Tenure −.0000965 −.0000949 −.0000963
(.0000149) (.0000138) −
Age2∗Tenure 2.03e− 07 2.00e− 07 2.03e− 07
(3.27e− 08) (2.91e− 08) −
Age∗Tenure2 2.43e− 08 2.58e− 08 2.43e− 08
(3.47e− 08) (3.20e− 08) −
Tenure .0172868 .0171138 .016948
(.0016133) (.0015543) −
Tenure2 −.0000339 −.0000347 −.0000339
(.000011) (.0000104) −
Constant 4.624496 4.618056 −2.907707
(.0573555) (.049042) −
Year Dummies Y es Y es −
N. Obs 36013 36013 158809
R2 (Pseudo R2) 0.2482 (0.1260) 1.0000
Table 2: Log Earnings Pooled OLS Regressions, t-statistics in parenthesis. For the Tobit model, the right
censoring point is 9.33, and there are 831 censored observations. (Data: CPS Displaced Workers/Job
Tenure Supplement, 1996-2006). The model is stationary, and the year dummies don’t have to be
included. The constant in the model differs from the estimated one, because the highest value of the
efficiency units is normalized to one. The OLS estimates for the model do not have standard errors,
because we are running only one very large simulation.
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Figure 1: Calibration - Model Fit.
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Figure 2: Earnings losses. Panel 1: workers with at least 3 years of tenure: model vs estimates in Davis
and von Wachter 2011 (DV). Panel 2: workers with at least 6 years of tenure: model vs estimates in
Couch and Placzek 2010 (CP).
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Severance pay
Months of wages/year 0 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.2
Unemployment rate (%) 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.4 6.4
Non-participants/searchers (%) 6.2 7.1 7.7 8.5 9.2
Output 100.0 99.7 99.5 99.5 99.6
Capital 100.0 99.1 98.6 97.8 98.9
Assets 100.0 98.9 98.2 97.2 98.1
Consumption 100.0 99.9 99.8 99.8 99.8
S.D. consumption 100.0 97.4 95.6 94.3 93.4
Welfare (newborns) 100.0 100.3 100.6 100.8 101.0
Welfare (average) 100.0 100.4 100.6 100.7 100.8
Table 3: Allocational and welfare effects of linear severance-pay
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Severance pay
Months of wages/year 0 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.2
Unemployment rate (%) 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.4
Non-participants/searchers (%) 6.2 6.6 7.0 7.6 8.5
Output – – – – –
Capital – – – – –
Assets 100.0 96.8 94.8 93.5 93.9
Consumption 100.0 99.8 99.7 99.7 99.8
S.D. consumption 100.0 95.6 92.9 91.5 91.5
Welfare (newborns) 100.0 100.5 101.0 101.3 101.5
Welfare (average) 100.0 100.4 100.8 101.1 101.4
Table 4: Allocational and welfare effects of linear severance-pay (constant interest rate)
Severance pay
Months of wages/year 0 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.2
Unemployment rate (%) 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.1 6.1
Non-participants/searchers (%) 1.6 1.8 2.1 2.4 2.7
Output 100.0 100.0 100.1 100.3 100.6
Capital 100.0 100.0 100.4 101.1 102.3
Assets 100.0 99.8 100.0 100.6 101.5
Consumption 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.1 100.1
S.D. consumption 100.0 99.6 99.3 99.5 99.8
Welfare (newborns) 100.0 100.2 100.3 100.4 100.5
Welfare (average) 100.0 100.1 100.0 99.9 99.7
Table 5: Allocational and welfare effects of linear severance-pay: no job-specific human capital
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Severance pay
Months of wages/year 0 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.2
Unemployment rate (%) 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.4 6.4
Non-participants/searchers (%) 6.6 7.1 7.8 8.6 9.4
Output 100.0 99.7 99.5 99.5 99.5
Capital 100.0 99.0 98.6 98.5 98.8
Assets 100.0 98.8 98.1 97.9 98.1
Consumption 100.0 99.9 99.8 99.8 99.8
S.D. consumption 100.0 97.5 95.6 94.4 93.6
Welfare (newborns) 100.0 100.3 100.6 100.8 101.0
Welfare (average) 100.0 100.4 100.6 100.8 100.9
Table 6: Allocational and welfare effects of linear severance-pay: tenure-independent separation rates
Severance pay
Months of wages 0 1.8 3.6 5.4 7.2
Unemployment rate (%) 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3
Non-participants/searchers (%) 6.2 6.7 6.9 7.1 7.1
Output 100.0 99.7 99.6 99.6 99.6
Capital 100.0 99.1 98.6 98.6 98.9
Assets 100.0 98.9 98.2 98.0 98.2
Consumption 100.0 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9
S.D consumption 100.0 98.5 97.4 96.0 94.8
Welfare (newborns) 100.0 100.3 100.6 100.8 101.0
Welfare (average) 100.0 100.3 100.5 100.7 100.7
Table 7: Allocational and welfare effects of (tenure-independent) severance-pay
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Appendix A. Data and model fit
Moment Data Model Moment Data Model
Unemployment rates
r 0.0400 0.0383 Age = 20 0.1361 0.1194
Age = 25 0.0759 0.0617
Tenure distribution Age = 30 0.0528 0.0557
Tenure = 0 0.3001 0.2744 Age = 35 0.0486 0.0520
Tenure = 2 0.1493 0.1867 Age = 40 0.0432 0.0493
Tenure = 4 0.1327 0.1308 Age = 45 0.0407 0.0467
Tenure = 6 0.0743 0.0941 Age = 50 0.0405 0.0431
Tenure = 8 0.0513 0.0694 Age = 55 0.0384 0.0411
Tenure = 10 0.0580 0.0523 Age = 60 0.0389 0.0394
Tenure = 12 0.0362 0.0400 Age = 65 0.0391 0.0377
Tenure = 14 0.0364 0.0311 Unemployment distribution
Tenure = 16 0.0244 0.0246 Age = 20 0.2093 0.2646
Tenure = 18 0.0216 0.0196 Age = 25 0.1448 0.1366
Tenure = 20 0.1156 0.0769 Age = 30 0.1118 0.1235
Discouraged workers 0.0605 0.0611 Age = 35 0.1155 0.1153
Age = 40 0.1079 0.1089
Age = 45 0.0992 0.1031
Age = 50 0.0875 0.0596
Age = 55 0.0626 0.0352
Age = 60 0.0410 0.0207
Age = 65 0.0203 0.0324
Table A.8: Model Fit - Empirical vs. Predicted Moments
The labor market data used in this paper come from the Current Population Sur-
vey (CPS): it’s a monthly survey of about 50,000 households conducted by the Bureau
of the Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The survey has been conducted for
more than 50 years. The CPS is the primary source of information on the labor force
characteristics of the U.S. population. The sample is scientifically selected to represent
the civilian non-institutional population. Data and codebooks can be downloaded from
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http://www.bls.census.gov/cps. Our sample selection rule is males, between the age
of 18 and 67, in the labor force, and with a valid observation for the tenure variable when
computing the wage regressions.
Table A.8 reports the fit of the model in terms of the set of moments targeted in the
calibration.
Table A.9 below reports levels of severance pay for a selected number of countries and
tenure levels.
Tenure
Country 9 months 4 years 20 years
Australia 0 1.9 2.8
Belgium 3 5 21
Canada 0 0 2.1
Denmark 0 0 0.9
Finland 0.5 0.9 6.1
France 0.9 2.8 7.5
Germanya 0.3 2 10
Ireland 0 2.1 9.6
Italy 2.6 5.8 21
Netherlands 0 6.1 20
Portugal 3 4 20
Spain 1.5 6 23
Sweden 0.9 3 6
U.K. 0.2 0.9 4.7
U.S. 0 0 0
a. Dependent on age and length of service; we assume
employment started at age 20.
Table A.9: Severance pay and/or notice period (in
months of wage)in selected OECD countries at three
different tenure levels, Source: OECD (2013). For
this group of economies there are different provisions
for different workers’ categories and type of dismissal.
For each country, the largest possible payments are
reported.
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